Intellectual and the Transformation
of the ‘Political’: An Analysis of the Metamorphosis of Turkish
Intellectual in the Last Two Decades
The term ‘intellectual’ has always implied a
political connotation within the Turkish political history.
Beginning with the early modernization movements, the intellectuals
of the country have always been the vanguards of the modernization
process and the political agents of Turkish political realm. In
other words, in Turkey being an intellectual amounts to taking a
political action (Belge, 1989). It might well be argued that,
“saving the state” has been the fundamental paradigm specific to
Turkish intellectual[1].
In that respect, ‘the political’ was the realm within
which the constitutive aspects of the intellectual identity had been
shaped and constructed. It was not until the eighties that such an
understanding lost its prominence. Eighties implied the decline of
the prominent role accorded to the realm of ‘the political’ as the
site upon which intellectual identity was to be constructed. The
period, while implying a deviation from the traditionally adopted
paradigm of Turkish intellectual (that of, ‘saving the state’), has
also given birth to a new kind of intellectual distancing
himself/herself not only from the state but also from the very realm
of “the political”. Then, the core assumption of the paper concerns
the parallelism and interaction between two parameters: the
transformation of the conception of politics and the transformation
of the intellectual of the country. On that basis, the study aims to
offer a general profile of intellectuals of the last two decades and
a discussion over the nature of ‘political’ within the concerned
period of time. The paper will focus on the continuities and
ruptures within the whole body of intellectual discourse with
regards to the pre-1980s. The fundamental question of the paper is
whether the newly adopted attitude towards ‘the political’ implies
the birth of a new intellectual or not.
The Legacy of the Past
The roots of the obsession of Turkish intellectuals
with ‘the political’ and more specifically with the paradigm of
‘saving the state’ can be traced back to the late-Ottoman period.
Most of the Ottoman intellectuals were bureaucrats and positioned at
the heart of the state. The first generation of late-Ottoman
intellectuals, shouldering the burden of avoiding the disintegration
of the empire, retained the reflexes of saving, defending and
protecting the state as the basic motivations behind their
intellectual activities. Therefore, their radicalism was framed by
their problematic relationship with ‘the state’. Mardin regards this
problematic relationship with the state as an outcome of the social
history of the intellectuals of the country and argues that this
distinct attitude of late-Ottoman intellectuals derived from their
commonly shared understanding of the “undeserved defeat of the
Ottoman culture”[2]
by the Western powers (1992:165). Accordingly, as a generation
witnessing the disintegration of the empire, the Ottoman
intelligentsia had associated itself with ‘the state’ and was never
able to put distance from the state power. The situation was
reinforced by the historical conjuncture within which the subjects
of the empire collaborated with the Western powers in their struggle
for independence.
The point is nowhere better expressed than in Belge’s
assessment that the glorious past of the country, paradoxically
emerged as the strongest hindrance for the intellectuals of the
country (1995:127). That is, the missions of saving and protecting
the state and initiating the modernization project were shaped by
the pressure of the once glorious past. Many scholars share the
belief that this problematic relationship of the late-Ottoman
intellectuals was inherited by the Republican intelligentsia. As the
Republican intellectuals defined their major task being the
vanguards of the modernization process and the initiators of the
project of reaching the level of Western civilization, they were far
from questioning their position with regard to the state authority.
In this sense, the question of the autonomy of the intellectual was
alien to the early Republican intelligentsia. They tended to see
themselves as the carriers of the modernist ideology of the newly
founded Republic and shouldered the task of ‘enlightening’ the
uneducated masses with a positivist outlook. This self-definition
had been marked with a sense of dependence on the state. This
so-called self-definition also self-imposed upon the intellectuals
of the country certain tasks and continued to be a central
consideration and priority for the future generations of
intellectuals. Even the emergence of new generation of intellectuals
raising their voice within a left-wing discourse during the sixties
did not imply a radical break with this tradition. That is, despite
its opposing ideological underpinnings, the Turkish intelligentsia,
in the main, has refrained from problematizing the state and
insisted on clinging to its traditional paradigm of “saving the
state”[3].
Mardin claims that Turkish history has never
witnessed a ‘cultural elite’ in the proper sense of the term (2001).
The underlying assumption of Mardin’s argument implies the dominant
position of ‘the political’ over ‘the cultural’ within Turkish
intellectual landscape. In Mardin’s account, while engaging in
politics, Turkish intellectual has always spoken from within a group
rather than raising his/her own individual voice (1984). In this
vein, parallel to the late-Ottoman intellectuals, adopting French
positivism as the major pillar of their thought and activity, the
Republican intelligentsia regarded the Jacobin mentality convenient
and practical in delineating and reaching the goals of
modernization. Therefore, this intelligentsia preferred to follow
the path that the French revolutionaries had followed and defined
their relation to ‘the political’ along the Jacobin lines. In this
regard, Mardin offers a distinction between the ‘literati’, who
speaks from within a group, and the ‘intellectual’ who is not only
critical but also far from retaining any sort of a collective task.
Needless to say, in Mardin’s view the Turkish ‘intellectual’ falls
within the former definition and does not deserve to be called as an
intellectual in the proper sense of the term (1984).
This analysis rests upon the assumption that contrary
to German Romantic tradition which has always retained a problematic
relation with the Enlightenment, French positivism had significant
influence in molding the ideas of Turkish intelligentsia. Since the
Nietschean conception of the ‘daemonic’ was alien to the Turkish
intellectual landscape and Romanticism was the only vehicle to
initiate the daemon, Turkish intellectual was never able to
‘confess’ his/her real thoughts which in turn brought about certain
limits to his/her inner resources and creativity (Mardin,1984). This
assessment suggests that the cost of inheriting the Jacobin
mentality on the part of Turkish intelligentsia has been the
theoretical and philosophical poverty of the prevailing intellectual
tradition. Then, a negative causality has been constructed between
the intellectual engagement and intellectual profundity. For
instance, according to Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Turkish intellectual’s
engagement is only political and this characteristic has put certain
limits to his/her intellectual development (1992).
It is true that, the political engagement of
intellectuals has been the dominant tendency in Turkey. As it is
mentioned above, similar to the path followed during the
late-Ottoman period, during the Republican era, intellectuals have
regarded themselves as the vanguards of the modernization project
and have been the voluntary carriers of the official and the
founding ideology of the regime, that of Kemalism. They have
occupied a prominent place within the Republican project as the
missionaries of the transformation of the society. In this regard,
their thoughts and ideas have been shaped under the dominance of
the official ideology. Even the opposing ideological stances, either
from the left or right of the political spectrum, have retained the
imprint of Kemalism. Then, Republican intellectuals have been the
heirs of the former generations in the sense that they have been the
vanguards of the westernization/modernization and have undertaken a
civilizing mission in accordance with the impositions defined by the
ruling elite.
In other words, undertaking a social role was the
sine qua non of being an intellectual. However, the intellectuals
having been aware of their historical mission of being the ultimate
source of the societal transformation could not escape from
experiencing an identity crisis. They took pains to define their own
identity regarding the East/West dichotomy. The crisis experienced
with regards to the East/West dichotomy has been the major
preoccupation of the literary intelligentsia and the fundamental
problematic of Turkish literature. Indeed, literature has been the
principal terrain through which the intellectuals of the country
have raised their voice. It might even be argued that, since the
early days of the modernization Turkish intellectual has been
associated with the literary realm[4].
Especially during the Republican period, prominent intellectuals
were not only political figures but also the literary ones. This was
also the case during the sixties. Sixties implied the rise of
opposing ideological stances on the political scene which then found
its reflection in the Turkish press and literature[5].
Within this period, the term ‘intellectual’ has been associated with
‘the left’ to a large extent and has almost become the synonym of
the latter.
Nevertheless, despite the newly emerging issues and
concerns, the story of the Turkish intellectual during the sixties
and seventies was far from revealing any sort of break with the
mentality of the former generations of intellectuals. Similar to
his/her predecessors, the intellectual of the era, with a few
singular exceptions, was willing to undertake the mission of
obsession with the state without ever questioning the boundaries
drawn by the official ideology. Accordingly, ‘the political’ was the
realm within which the constitutive aspects of the intellectual
identity had been shaped and constructed. It might even be argued
that, during the sixties and seventies, almost everyone belonging to
the intellectual circles shared the belief that political commitment
was the precondition and even the major inspiration of the
intellectual work.
As it has been already stated, such an understanding
has begun to lose its prominence during the eighties. Obviously,
the political environment after the 1980 coup was decisive in this
particular change. As it is well-known, in the aftermath of the 1980
coup, Turkey experienced an ideological renewal and political
restructuring. Still, the issue cannot be simply reduced to the
specific conditions of Turkey since developments throughout the
world have also brought about a certain transformation within the
frames of references not only of Turkish intellectuals but also of
the intellectuals of almost all countries. ‘Post-modernism’,
‘radical democracy’, ‘globalization’ and ‘civil society’ have
appeared as the most fashionable topics of either the academic or
the intellectual landscape. Turkish intelligentsia have utilized
these themes and headings as constitutive elements in defining their
ideological and political priorities and more specifically their
intellectual identities.
This background suggests that there has appeared a
break within the intellectual formation of the country during the
last two decades. The period implied a deviation from the
traditionally adopted paradigm of Turkish intellectual (that of,
‘saving the state’) and has also given birth to a new kind of
intellectual distancing himself/herself not only from the state but
also from the very realm of “the political”.
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The Early Signs of the Metamorphosis:
Period After the 1980 Military Takeover
As the analysis of the eighties involves the
transformation of the country on several grounds, that of economy,
ideology and politics, the constitutive characteristics of the
intellectuals of the period have been exposed to a significant
transformation during the mentioned time period. Then, the first
period of the changing nature of Turkish intellectual was opened up
by the September 12, 1980 military coup. The coup destroyed and
liquidated the leftist movements in the country and sent politically
engaged intellectuals either to dungeons or to their homes. Outright
bans and oppression put certain limits to the intellectual
activities. The coup was to be equated with the ‘state repression’.
Despite the oppressive environment it brought about, the early signs
of the attempts towards ‘problematizing the state’ by the
intellectuals of the country was one significant contribution of the
coup of 12 September 1980. Therefore, beginning with the early
eighties the issues concerned with the heading of ‘problematizing
the state’ appeared within the first ranks of the intellectual
debates.
As indicated above, the efforts of ‘problematizing
the state’ was an outcome of the environment created by the coup.
However, there was one another major factor that facilitated such
lines of thinking. It was the operating ideology during the
eighties: new-right. In the eighties, Turkey underwent a process of
political restructuring and ideological renewal. The period implied
for a complete reorganization of the country’s political structure
(Yalman, 2002). In 1980, Turkey began to liberalize its financial
system in order to integrate with global financial markets (Cizre
and Yeldan, 2000). With the 24th January 1980 decisions the import
substitution strategy was abandoned and export-oriented capital
accumulation model was adopted. This required the reduction of state
intervention and the limitation of state power. However, the
restructuring of the economy and the politics could only be
legitimated through the effective functioning of a new hegemonic
project. Özalizm was the solution to the problem. Under the
leadership of T. Özal, then prime minister and president of Turkey
and the leader of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi), Özalizm
was introduced as the new-right ideology articulating elements of
liberalism, conservatism, nationalism and social justice into its
political discourse (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002). The new hegemonic
project, Özalizm, relied on the adoption of the rhetoric of free
market and open economy and emphasized the instrumentality of market
ideology. This anti-statist discourse was also responsible for the
theoretical attempts of the intellectuals in ‘problematizing the
state’.
The state repression of the 1980 coup and the
anti-statist discourse of Özalizm did not only pave the way towards
the ‘problematizing the state’ on theoretical and ideological
levels, but they also brought about the atmosphere convenient for
the questioning of the official ideology. That is, during the
mentioned period of time Kemalism, the official and long lasting
ideology of Turkish Republic, suffered a severe crisis of legitimacy
and began to lose its once pivotal role.
All these developments conditioned the ideas and
thoughts of Turkish intellectuals and created the grounds for the
emergence of a new intellectual profile considerably different from
the previous one. In contrast to the intellectual priorities of the
ideological and political landscape of the sixties and seventies,
the concepts of ‘consensus’, ‘conciliation’ and ‘civil society’
emerged as the fundamental elements of the conceptual framework of
this new profile. Many intellectuals occupying opposing places in
the political spectrum began to share almost similar concerns about
the questions of state and official ideology. The emergence of the
‘civil society’ debate on the agenda of Turkish intellectual life
was a reflection of the mentioned developments. Intellectuals
committed to different and opposing ideological standpoints shared
the belief that the weakness of civil society was the main factor
behind the failure of democracy in Turkey and emphasized the
desirability for the renewal of civil society in the country. The
concept of ‘civil society’ was exhausted by almost all political
groups, -liberals, conservatives, social democrats, socialists and
Islamists- as the central motifs of their ideological discourses.
The debates around the ‘civil society’ and the
efforts of problematizing the state and questioning of the official
ideology, Kemalism, all indicated the erosion of the traditional
paradigm specific to Turkish intellectual, that of ‘saving the
state’. This erosion which implied a discursive shift also
emphasized the early signs of a new portrait released from its
former traditional reflexes.
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Post-Political Intellectual of the
90s
12th September regime prepared the Turkish economy
and polity to the new path of capital accumulation and paved the
ways for the integration with the global financial markets. During
the nineties, the liberalization of the economy gained a further
momentum (Yalman, 2002). The implementation of neo-liberal policies
generated social tensions due to the deterioration of income
distribution. The hegemonic project of Özalizm continued to function
as a mechanism relieving the tensions that were to be the outcomes
of the extreme neo-liberal practices. Still, it was unable to
overcome the demands raised by the political Islam and Kurdish
movement. These two referred to the attempts of questioning of the
modernist secularism and social project and the search for new
references of identities. Kurdish nationalism and political Islam
implied the loss of the relevance of existing forms of
representation and they together appeared as a challenge against the
official ideology. To sum up, “the political conjuncture in Turkey
throughout the 1990s was dominated by the aggravating Kurdish
question, the revival of the Islamic movement, and their suppression
by the state” (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002:196).
The intellectual of the nineties was born within this
environment. As it has been stated earlier, s/he was the product of
an atmosphere which was conditioned and colored by a distorted
individualism, a culture of ‘making an easy buck’, an extremely
eclectic and degenerate market fetishism and social conservatism.
Needless to say, the period has not given birth to one single
profile of intellectual. There appeared differing profiles occupying
opposing stances within the political spectrum. Still, they have
shared almost similar reflexes and attitudes which might be labeled
under the generalization of ‘the intellectual of the nineties’. They
all shared a similar conception of politics and have almost had
similar intellectual and political priorities. Accordingly, in order
to draw the general portrait of the intellectual of the concerned
period of time, the transformation within the content of politics in
the country needs to be examined.
‘Civil society’ was the most fashionable theme of the
eighties. In the nineties, ‘civil society’ debates continued to
occupy a prominent place within the intellectual circles. However,
despite the intellectual interest towards the theme, nineties have
witnessed a paradoxical development in terms of the relationship
between state and society: “while the impulse of the ‘civil society’
to engage in public life to express its grievances has grown, the
insulation of the state from popular pressures has grown even
further” (Cizre and Yeldan, 2002:493). The conceptualizations of
civil society shared a common mistake: They all ignored the
political nature of civil society and tended to regard it as an
apolitical entity. Parallel to the neo-liberal understanding,
‘politics’ itself was stripped of its political content and reduced
to a technical issue and in particular, to administration. In that
sense, during the nineties, “the political” appeared to be a
“shrinking realm in a physical and qualitative sense” (Cizre and
Yeldan, 2000:495). Intellectual of the nineties, in contrast to the
his/her former predecessors, preferred to utilize the concept of
‘consensus’ and based his/her understanding of “the political” upon
this single concept. Politics continued to exist as the major source
of inspiration for the intellectual development. However, at this
time its content was exposed to a significant change and reduced to
“a practice of recognizing the other and of reaching a consensus,
reject the friend-enemy relations, regard “ideological” or
antagonistic conceptions of politics as illegitimate, and limit the
sphere of the political to a democratic play of differences and a
plurality without antagonism” (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002:196).
Relying on this understanding of “the political”, intellectuals have
gathered around “post-political discourses” (Erdoğan and Üstüner,
2002) of second republicanism, civil Islamism and post-liberalism.
All these three discourses have shared a criticism of the state and
the official ideology and regarded the democracy as a virtue in
itself. The “post-liberal intellectual” who has born out of these
discourses has tended to maintain a distance towards any sort of
antagonistic politics. S/he has offered the “peaceful coexistence of
differences” without even considering the constitutive power of “the
political”. In that vein, s/he insisted to retain the similar
dilemmas, reflexes, motivations and missions of the former
generations of intellectuals with the exception of an antagonistic
conceptualization of “the political”.
i
Eylem Akdeniz, Bilkent University.
- This paper is
presented at
the Middle East History and Theory Conference,
The University of
Chicago, April
30th and May 1st, 2004,
Chicago, Illinois.
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Besides, literary realm has for a
long time been regarded as the site of the leftist
intellectuals. As Karpat points out, the country’s leading
leftists were versed in Western literature and “the really
significant leftist activity after 1925 was to be found in
literature.” (1966:175).
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